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An exponential growth model was fitted to critical care 
admissions from two surveillance databases to deter-
mine likely coronavirus disease (COVID-19) case num-
bers, critical care admissions and epidemic growth 
in the United Kingdom before the national lockdown. 
We estimate, on 23 March, a median of 114,000 (95% 
credible interval (CrI): 78,000–173,000) new cases 
and 258 (95% CrI: 220–319) new critical care reports, 
with 527,000 (95% CrI: 362,000–797,000) cumulative 
cases since 16 February.
The first reported cases of coronavirus disease (COVID-
19) in the United Kingdom (UK) were identified in late 
January 2020 [1]. By 23 March, when a national lockdown 
prohibiting non-essential movement was announced, 
reported cases had increased to over 6,000. However, 
reported cases are probably a small fraction of total 
infections because most COVID-19 cases are mild or 
even asymptomatic [2]. Also, the proportion of infec-
tions that are reported changes by setting and over 
time, depending on the intensity of population-based 
surveillance, testing and contact tracing. However, 
COVID-19 patients admitted to critical care (high-
dependency or intensive care units, hereafter CC) offer 
a more stable indicator, since CC patients suspected 
of having COVID-19 have always been tested in the 
UK. We used the two COVID-19 CC surveillance data-
bases available at the start of the epidemic, combined 
with data on reporting delays and disease severity to 
determine the likely number of and increase in infected 
people during the first phase of the COVID-19 epidemic 
in the UK. This work informed estimates produced by 
the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling 
(SPI-M) to advise the UK’s Department for Health and 
Social Care on its COVID-19 response.
Data sources
Two data sources were used for CC case numbers:
(i) Public Health England (PHE) compiled the First Few 
Hundred (FF100) database containing virologically con-
firmed COVID-19 cases in the UK during the first phase 
of the epidemic [3]. We extracted ‘sporadic’ cases 
which were those identified through CC surveillance 
rather than contact tracing or targeted testing of trav-
ellers from high-risk countries, so that our analyses 
focussed on epidemic spread within the UK rather than 
including case importation. A few sporadic cases were 
identified through sentinel primary care testing rather 
than CC but could not be identified as such; however, 
there were only three such cases so the numbers were 
too small to affect our results. Sporadic cases were 
extracted from 16 February (the earliest date of onset 
for a sporadic case) to 6 March; cases peaked at six per 
day on 6 March and then declined, indicating that the 
FF100 was increasingly incomplete.
(ii) PHE and National Health Service (NHS) England 
compiled CC cases in the COVID-19 Hospitalisations 
in England Surveillance System (CHESS) database 
which were collected on 15–20 March (the seven cases 
reported on 13 and 14 March were ignored as the sys-
tem was not fully operational then) [4].
We estimated the age-dependent risk of an infected 
case being admitted to CC by fitting our models to 
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Figure 
Model estimates of daily new COVID-19 infections and critical care reports in the initial phase of the epidemic compared 
with source data, United Kingdom, February–March 2020
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analyses of case data from China [5] and the United 
States (US) [6], with recently released Italian data [7] 
used in a sensitivity analysis (details in  Supplement 
Chapter 1).
Modelling
The same model was fitted independently to the inci-
dence of patients admitted to CC based on (i) their date 
of symptom onset (for FF100 patients) or (ii) their date 
of admission (for CHESS patients, as date of symptom 
onset was not reported), using a Poisson likelihood 
with rate AeBt , where A is the initial number of cases on 
16 February, B  is the growth rate of the epidemic,  t  is 
time in days after 16 February and e is the exponential 
constant (see Supplement Chapter 4). Delays between 
symptom onset and reporting were accounted for by 
fitting a gamma distribution to time between symp-
tom onset and CC admission for FF100 patients 
(see Supplement Chapter 2). When fitting modelled CC 
admissions to FF100, incidence was inflated by 18.6% 
compared with CC admissions fitted to CHESS, to 
adjust for the ratio of the population of the UK to that 
of England (the ratio of reported COVID-19 cases in the 
UK to that reported in England on 15–23 March would 
give a similar inflation factor of 19.8%).
A and B were sampled from their posterior distributions 
by using importance sampling; 10,000 parameter 
sets for both were drawn from uniform distributions 
between 0 and 1, and then resampled with replacement 
at a probability for each sample weighted by the 
likelihood of that parameter set. Projected CC cases 
were then divided by age-dependent risks of CC admis-
sion to estimate actual infections in the population 
(Supplement Chapter 1).
Results
We estimated that each COVID-19 case admitted to 
CC reported in FF100 and CHESS corresponded to a 
median of 124 (95% credible interval (CrI): 81–11,500) 
and 120 (95% CrI: 76–46,600) infected individuals in 
the population, respectively, based on Chinese and US 
severity data [5,6].
The  Figure  shows the number of incident cases 
estimated on each day between 16 February and 23 
March. On 23 March, 114,000 (95% CrI: 78,000–
173,000) new cases and 258 (95% CrI: 220–319) CC 
reports are estimated to have occurred, with 527,000 
(95% CrI: 362,000–797,000) cumulative cases since 
16 February. The best fitting exponential growth rates 
were consistent with an epidemic doubling time of 2.8 
days (95% CrI: 2.6–3.0). Assuming an exponentially 
distributed serial interval of 4 days [8] gave an (approx-
imate) reproduction number of 2.0 (95% CrI: 1.9–2.1). If 
we assume a longer serial interval of 6 days that may 
be expected at the start of an epidemic, the reproduc-
tion number could be 2.5 (95% CrI: 2.4–2.6).
We performed sensitivity analyses on the datasets 
used for fitting, sensitivity of case detection and 
reporting, period of validity of the FF100 data and 
severity of COVID-19. Across the scenarios, the num-
ber of new infections on 23 March ranged from 95,000 
(95% CrI: 62,000–182,000) to 143,000 (95% CrI: 
95,000–228,000) (Supplement Chapter 3).
For validation, we compared the median total number 
of CC admissions from 16 to 23 March (with that period 
of time chosen to correspond to an average duration 
of CC stay of 8 days in Wuhan data [9]) with the preva-
lence of COVID-19 patients in CC on 23 March (i.e. num-
ber of patients reported to be in CC) according to NHS 
England’s situation report. Our model projected that 
1,200 (95% CrI: 1,060–1,380) patients were in CC on 
23 March, ca 68% more than the figure of 714 from the 
situation report when inflated to account for the larger 
UK population.
Discussion
Our results suggest that hundreds of thousands of 
COVID-19 infections had occurred in the UK by the time 
the national lockdown of 23 March was implemented, 
with incidence doubling every 2.8 (95% CrI: 2.6–3.0) 
days. This suggests that only around 1% of infections 
were being detected and reported, since the official 
case count on 23 March was 6,650 [1]. This provides 
evidence that strict physical distancing was necessary 
to prevent health services from being overwhelmed.
However, these figures are still orders of magnitude 
below the scenarios from Lourenço et al. [10] that sug-
gest that the majority of the UK population (66 mil-
lion) could have already been infected by that date. 
The Lourenço scenarios producing these conclusions 
rely on severity pyramids that are much milder than 
those observed from Chinese [5], US [6] and Italian 
[7] data. Our own analyses indicate that severity is 
indeed a key driver of uncertainty in case estimates but 
across all scenarios, the majority of the UK population 
remained uninfected, and hence timely interventions 
to reduce physical contact could have a large impact. 
Importantly, our analyses relied on data from these 
countries only to establish the proportion of infected 
people who required critical care (which we expect to 
vary less between countries with reasonable health-
care access), and not for parameters likely to differ 
widely between countries such as the proportion of 
cases which are reported.
Our investigations revealed weaknesses in two early 
sources of CC surveillance (FF100 and CHESS). In par-
ticular, the number of cases reported in the two data-
bases differ markedly, with the FF100 reporting far 
fewer CC cases (e.g. six cases on 6 March from FF100 
compared with 100 on 18 March from CHESS). Our 
model projections suggest that the FF100 numbers 
are lower even after accounting for different periods of 
coverage and delays to reporting. Further analysis also 
suggested delays between the date of being reported 
as a case and the date on which a case is actually 
recorded in the FF100 database which made correcting 
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for right-truncation of cases difficult (see  Supplement 
Chapter 2). Also, the proportion of cases estimated 
to require CC treatment was substantially lower than 
observed in other countries (and hence the multiplica-
tion factors to convert CC cases to infections are higher) 
because of the young age profile of CC cases in both 
FF100 and CHESS. For example, 34% of CC patients 
were younger than 45 years in CHESS compared with 
only 12% in published US data up to 16 March [6]. This 
may reflect biases in CHESS reporting, differential pro-
pensity to test by age or a higher triage threshold for 
CC admission of older patients than in the US.
The overall conclusion that COVID-19 daily incidence in 
the UK on 23 March was in the hundreds of thousands 
of infections and cumulative incidence around half a 
million appears to be robust even when challenged by 
a range of sensitivity analyses to account for differ-
ent assumptions. Our model was fitted to data from 
early on in the epidemic (16 February) to just before 
the national lockdown (20 March). Furthermore, the 
order of magnitude is the same as data from situation 
reports that have less granularity but possibly better 
coverage. Lower numbers in the situation reports may 
in part reflect decreasing propensity to admit patients 
as CC beds become filled, in line with triage guidelines 
issued during the pandemic [9]. In addition, our model 
may have slightly overestimated cases if their rate of 
increase had slowed down even before the lockdown 
started. This highlights the need to triangulate case 
estimates from multiple surveillance streams whenever 
possible. Our investigations highlight the usefulness 
of CC surveillance in understanding epidemic dynam-
ics and informing response measures, and hence the 
need for timely and complete reporting over the course 
of the epidemic.
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